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INTRODUCTION

udges, courts, legal institutions, and legal commentators long have
stressed the value of cooperative discovery. Through judicial
rulings, sanction awards, the creation of local rules and discovery
guidelines, and the formation of aspirational documents designed to
promote cooperation, courts and legal commentators have attempted to
drill the value of cooperation in the discovery process into the hearts
and minds of litigants and their counsel. While the judicial beatings
are likely to continue until morale improves, some thought should be
devoted to why morale is low on the cooperation front and what
efforts can be made to improve it.
In this article, we argue that cooperative discovery, a concept
promoted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the local rules of a
number of United States District Courts, case law, and legal
scholarship, presents a prisoner's dilemma: Despite the fact that it is in
the best interest of parties and their counsel to cooperate in the
discovery process, they largely fail to do so. When the discovery
game becomes iterative-that is, when it is played over and over again
1The Honorable Paul. W Grimm is a United States District Judge for the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland. Judge Grimm received a B.A.,
summa cum laude, from the University of California, Davis, and graduated magna
cum laude from the University of New Mexico School of Law. Judge Grimm retired
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and articles on civil procedure, evidence, and trial practice, and currently serves as
an adjunct faculty member at the University of Baltimore and University of
Maryland Schools of Law. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors
themselves, and do not purport to be those of the federal judiciary, or of the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland.
2 Heather Leigh Williams received a B.A. from the University of Rochester, and
graduated cum laude from the University of Maryland School of Law. Ms. Williams
had the privilege of serving as the law clerk to the Honorable Paul W. Grimm in
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by the same players-the actors' conduct may shift, becoming more or
less cooperative depending on the nature of the interactions, and the
success of efforts at cooperation over time. Many factors, whether
institutional, strategic, or attitudinal, may dissuade a party or its
counsel from cooperating. We consider these factors throughout this
article, proceeding as follows: In Part I, we explain the prisoner's
dilemma theory and provide a brief background of game theory and its
application to the legal field. In Part II, we outline the theory that
cooperative discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma. In so doing, we
identify and describe conceptions of cooperation in the American
discovery model and consider, with the help of examples drawn from
the case law, how this model creates a prisoner's dilemma for its
participants. In Part III, we consider ways to move beyond the
prisoner's dilemma, offering suggestions for ways that our discovery
model may be tweaked so that its participants are no longer trapped
inside the game's boxes.
I.

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

The so-called prisoner's dilemma, as originally imagined by Merrill
Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, and named by A.W. Tucker soon
thereafter,3 involves a scenario where two prisoners, separately
detained and under questioning or interrogation, must decide whether
"to stay silent or to squeal on their confederate."' More generally, the
prisoner's dilemma is used as a model to describe any "game' 5 in
which "two parties acting individually wind up with an outcome worse
for both of them than the outcome that they could obtain through
cooperation."6
3 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

216 (rev. ed. 2006).

4 Steven Gensler, Some Thoughts on Lawyer's E- Volving Duties
in Discovery, 36 N.

KY. L. REV. 521, 551 n. 171 (2009) (citing John K. Seatar, The Barristerand the
Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation,NuclearDeterrence,andDiscovery Abuse, 69
B. U. L. REV. 569, 578 (1989)).
5The prisoner's dilemma is one of many models in the field of
game theory. See
ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 1 (1997); DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, GAME THEORY & THE LAW 1 (1994). Game theory provides a mechanism
for understanding how rational, self-interested individuals interact with each other.
Id. A "game" is played "whenever the fate of an individual in [a] group depends not
only on his actions but also on the actions of the rest of the individuals in the group."
KEN BINMORE, ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 1 (1990).
6 Setear, supra note 4, at 578; see also AXELROD, supra
note 3, at 7 (explaining

that
the basic problem in the prisoner's dilemma "occurs when the pursuit of self-interest
by each leads to a poor outcome for all").

Judicial Beatings

20131

The basic model for the prisoner's dilemma is represented by the
following figure and framed as follows: Two players (the column
player and the row player) each have two choices-cooperate or
defect. 7 Each player must decide whether to cooperate or defect
simultaneously and independently, without knowing what the other
player will do.8 The results of those choices are displayed in the
figure's matrix: Both players could cooperate, resulting in each player
doing equally and fairly well, as represented by the value of three
shown in the figure.9 That value could be a dollar payoff, or a benefit
In the traditional
of some kind incurred over the other player."
conception of the prisoner's dilemma, the numerical values represent
the number of years each player would spend in jail.11 Alternatively,
either player could defect while the other player cooperates. 2 In that
scenario, the defecting player obtains the game's highest possible
payoff (five), while the non-defecting player gets nothing-the socalled "sucker's payoff."' 3 Lastly, both players could defect, resulting
in each obtaining an equal, but smaller, payoff. 4
Column Player:
Row Player:

Cooperate
Defect

Cooperate
3, 3
5, 0

Defect
0, 5
1, 1

The strategic problem presented by the game is this: If both players
cooperate, each player undoubtedly is better off than if both players
defect. 1" However, it is in each player's individual self-interest to
6
defect, regardless of what that player thinks the other player will do.'
Why? If the row player cooperates, the column player obtains a
higher payoff by defecting (five versus three). If the row player
defects, the column player again obtains a higher payoff by defecting
(one versus zero). As a result, regardless of what the column player
7AXELROD,
8AXELROD,

supra note 3, at 7-8.
supra note 3, at 7-8.

9 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.
10 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.
11 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.

12 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.
13 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.

14 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8.

15 See Julia Y. Lee, GainingAssurances, 2012 WIs. L. REv. 1137, 1142 (2012).
16 See id.
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thinks the row player will do (cooperate or defect), it is in the column
player's interest, from a purely payoff-focused perspective, to defect."
But, the same rationale applies for the row player too. From the row
player's perspective, which is equally focused on individual payout,
the best choice is to defect.
Thus, both players, acting only in their own self-interest and
focused only on obtaining their own optimal payouts, are motivated to
defect. 8 Unfortunately for everyone involved, the result of mutual
defection is that both players get a payout of one, which is worse than
the payout of three that they could have gotten by both cooperating. 9
The focus on individual interest and payouts leads to a worse outcome
for both players than could be achieved through cooperation.
Game theory, and specifically the prisoner's dilemma, has long
been applied to the legal field. In recent years, the prisoner's dilemma
has been used to understand the choices made by litigants and their
attorneys in various phases of litigation, from alternative dispute
resolution" to the decision to oppose a motion for summary judgment
filed by a co-party.2 ' As other commentators have pointed out, parties
and attorneys involved in discovery often end up in a prisoner's
dilemma, with each side using discovery abusively in anticipation that
the other party will do the same. 2 We add to this discussion by
considering the discovery dilemma in the context not only of abusive
discovery, but another frequent problem is evasive and non-responsive
discovery. We also consider how the discovery game changes over
iterations, meaning in multiple games played by the same players.
Finally, we offer suggestions for tweaking our discovery model so that
its participants can step outside of the game's boxes.

17 AXELROD,

supra note 3, at 9.

Lee, supra note 15, at 1142.
19 AXELROD, supra note
3, at 9.
20
See, e.g., DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
18

25-26 (1989).

21 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Wolfson, Warring Teammates: Standing
to Oppose a CoParty'sMotionfor Summary Judgment, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 570-72 (2012)
(using the prisoner's dilemma to understand a party's decision to oppose a motion

for summary judgment filed by a co-party in the context of antitrust, tort, and civil
rights cases).

22 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, PartyRulemaking: Making
ProceduralRules Through

Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1355 (2012); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, DisputingThrough Agents: Cooperationand Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1994); Seatear, supra note 6, at 584-86.
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II.

COOPERATIVE DISCOVERY AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA

A.

CooperativeDiscovery

Cooperative discovery is an approach to discovery endorsed by
numerous judges throughout the country, and embodied in documents
23
such as the Sedona Conference's 2009 Cooperation Proclamation.
The goal of the Cooperation Proclamation is to ensure zealous
advocacy and decrease litigation costs through cooperation,
24
collaboration, and transparency in the discovery process. The notion
of discovery as a cooperative, rather than a combative, endeavor is
articulated clearly by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
encourage counsel to coordinate and cooperate throughout the
discovery process. For example, under Rule 26(f), the parties are
directed to confer as early as possible in the litigation to discuss
25
potential issues and develop a proposed discovery plan. Under Rule
26(c), any motion seeking a protective order must be accompanied by
a certification that the moving party in good faith has conferred, or
attempted to confer with opposing counsel, to resolve the dispute
without court intervention. 26 Likewise, under Rule 37(a), any motion
to compel discovery or disclosure must be accompanied by a
certification of good faith.27 As a general matter, Rule 37 authorizes
sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery, although without
what cooperation means or requiring it in the text
explicitly defining
28
of the rule itself.
Beyond the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
encourage conference and cooperation in discovery, many United
'States District Courts have implemented local rules addressing
cooperation. For example, "in the interest of reducing delay and
expense," the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois mandates that counsel coordinate to create "cooperative
discovery arrangements. "29 The District Court for the District of
Massachusetts encourages "cost effective discovery by means of
The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference CooperationProclamation, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009) [hereinafter CooperationProclamation].
23

24 id.

26

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).

27

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1).

25

28 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
29

S.D. Ill. R. 26.1(d).

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 43.2

voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their
attorneys," and recommends both formalized discovery stipulations, as
well as "informal, cooperative discovery practices in which counsel
provide information to opposing counsel without resort to formal
discovery procedures."3
In several districts, the Local Rules announce the Court's
expectations with regard to discovery. In the District Courts for the
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, "counsel are expected to
cooperate with each other, consistent with the interests of their clients,
in all phases of the discovery process and to be courteous in their
dealings with each other, including in matters relating to scheduling
and timing of various discovery procedures."'" The Districts of
Oregon and Wyoming feature nearly identical rules, with the District
of Oregon adding that the Court "may impose sanctions if it finds that
counsel has been unreasonable in not accommodating the legitimate
requests of opposing counsel."32 Where attorneys' fees are applicable,
"the Court may take a lack of cooperation into consideration in setting
the fee."33
The District Court for the District of Maryland has further
expounded upon the notion of cooperative discovery in its detailed
Discovery Guidelines.34 The Guidelines provide that all "parties and
counsel have an obligation to cooperate in planning and conducting
discovery to tailor the discovery to ensure that it meets [the
Guidelines'] objectives [of satisfying the Federal Rules' goals of
proportionality and the just, speedy, and inexpensive conduct of
discovery]."" Under the Guidelines, "counsel have a duty to confer
early and throughout the case as needed to ensure that discovery is
planned and conducted consistent with these requirements and, where
necessary, make adjustments and modifications in discovery as
D. Mass. R. 26.1(a).
See generally E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4; S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4. The Local
Rules in
the Eastern and South Districts of New York (which are identical) also offer a
helpful way of thinking about the common problem of evasive or non-responsive
discovery responses: "Discovery requests shall be read reasonably in the recognition
that the attorney serving them generally does not have the information being sought
and the attorney receiving them generally does have such information or can obtain
it from the client." E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4(b); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4(b).
12 D. Or. R. 83.8(b); D. Wyo.
Civ. R. 83.3.
33 D. Or. R. 83-8(b). Even if not embodied in a specific
rule, many courts do this.
34
See generally D. Md. Loc. Adm. R., App'x A, Discovery Guidelines
[hereinafter
Discovery
Guidelines].
35
Id., Guideline L.a.
30

31
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needed."36 The court encourages counsel, during their consultation,
"to think creatively and to make proposals to one another about
alternatives or modifications to the discovery otherwise permitted that
would permit discovery to be completed in a more just, speedy,
inexpensive way."37 Moreover,
[a]ttorneys are expected to behave
professionally and with courtesy towards
all involved in the discovery process,
including but not limited to opposing
counsel, parties and non-parties. This
includes cooperation and civil conduct in
an adversary system. Cooperation and
civility include, at a minimum, being open
for,
to, and reasonably available
discussion of legitimate differences in
order to achieve the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of the action and
Cooperation and
every proceeding.
communication can reduce the costs of
discovery, and they are an obligation of
counsel.3"
With regard to discovery disputes, the Guidelines reaffirm Rule
37(a)'s requirement that, whenever possible, "attorneys are expected
to communicate with each other in good faith throughout the discovery
process to resolve disputes without the need for intervention by the
Court, and should do so promptly after becoming aware of the grounds
for the dispute."39
Cooperative discovery is not just an aspirational notion contained
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the accompanying local
rules of many federal district courts. Instead, it is a notion actively
demanded by judges throughout the country. For example, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has
acknowledged that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and [various]
Rules of Professional Conduct-not to mention the various codes of
civility-contemplate cooperation among counsel during the discovery
36
37

38
39

id.
1d.

Guideline 1.d.
ld.,
Id., Guideline if.
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process. '4° According to the Arkansas court, such cooperation
"manifestly includes responding to telephone calls and other
communications" of opposing counsel. 41 Where parties fail to
cooperate, it adds to the cost of litigation and leads to "escalating
vexation and imbroglios. 42 Similarly, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California noted in a recent case that
counsel's failure to provide prompt disclosures regarding the scope
and nature of their cases and defenses, and their corresponding failure
to cooperate to define the counters of appropriate discovery, "threatens
the fair and cost-effective exchange of relevant discovery. ' 43 As the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland has stated, the
cost of discovery is "widely criticized as being excessive-to the point
of pricing litigants out of court."44
Cooperative discovery is particularly important in cases involving
extensive discovery of electronically stored information ("ESI"),
where the sheer amount of information to be retrieved, sorted, and
processed complicates discovery and increases the costs of litigation,
as does the need to retain experts who are well-versed in generating
ESI search terms, retrieving information from ESI, and converting ESI
into a useable and manageable format. 45 As the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York has noted, cases
involving ESI particularly require "cooperation between opposing
counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and
production," especially with regard to generating and testing keyword
searches with the assistance of the ESI's custodians. 46 Thus, in the
federal court's view, "the best solution in the entire area of electronic
' This view is endorsed by
discovery is cooperation among counsel."47
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), which requires that the parties
meet and confer with an eye towards developing a plan for producing

40

Baptists Health v. Smith, 393 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721 (E.D. Ark. 2005).

41 id.
42 id.

Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008).
Paul W. Grimm et al., New Paradigmfor Discovery Practice:Cooperation,MD.
B.J. 26, 28 (Nov./Dec. 2010).
46 William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Manuf. Mut.
Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D.
134,
136
(S.D.N.Y.
2009).
47
Id. (explicitly and strongly endorsing The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclamation).
43
44
45
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any discoverable ESI, a process that cannot occur without
cooperation.48
In an older case, the Seventh Circuit reminded its bar that the real
victims of uncooperative discovery are the parties.49 The record in the
case, Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co.," ° reflected "a discovery phase in
which the parties' respective counsel were combative, obstinate, and
wholly uncooperative in the process of exchanging information
pertinent to the litigation."'" Plaintiffs counsel claimed that the
defendant was "continuously dragging its feet, refusing to comply with
various discovery requests," while defense counsel complained that
Plaintiff's demands were unrealistic and that Plaintiffs counsel
"declined to be flexible concerning the scheduling and timing of [the
defendant's] compliance." 52 The Court noted that this was the latest in
a string of discovery disputes, stating that, from the record, it was
unable to "discern whether either party possesses a monopoly on the
contumacious conduct displayed" throughout discovery. 3 The Court
was not "happy with the progress, or should say lack of progress,
relating to getting this case ready for trial."54 It was apparent to the
Court that counsel in the case did not like each other, would not get
along, and would not cooperate in discovery. "The people who suffer
when this happens," the Court stated bluntly, "are the parties."55
From the above discussion, there seem to be many reasons for
counsel to engage in cooperative discovery, including direction from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of many
federal district courts and the guidance of judges across the country.
Moreover, it seems to be widely understood that failure to engage in
cooperative discovery is likely to increase the costs, and-complexity,
of litigation to the detriment of everyone involved. 6 Why, then, is
cooperative discovery not more widely practiced by litigants and their
attorneys?

48

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (discussing the material to be included in a discovery

plan).
49 See Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co., 94 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
50
id,
51 Id. at 306.
52
id,
53 id,
54

id.
55 Sweat, 94 F.3d at 306.
56 CooperationProclamation,supra note 27, at 361.
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The CooperativeDiscovery Dilemma

Cooperative discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma for various
institutional, attitudinal, and strategic reasons. Each party anticipates
or expects that the other party will approach discovery
uncooperatively, or engage in discovery that is abusive or evasive, and
so responds in kind. 7 The "fear of being disadvantaged if the other
side were to take a non-cooperative approach to discovery" often leads
both sides to reject cooperation, despite the fact that approaching
discovery cooperatively could reduce overall discovery expense for
both sides, while still allowing each party to obtain essential
information to which it is entitled. 8
The cooperative discovery dilemma may be attitudinal. It has long
been thought that discovery should be a game, where players stall,
obfuscate, and contest all discovery and produce only that which they
cannot find an excuse for withholding. 9 Cooperation and courtesy to
opposing parties and their counsel has been seen as weakness, which
has been taken advantage of by dilatory, evasive, or abusive tactics of
less cooperative or courteous counsel. As a result, cooperation and
courtesy is discouraged to the disadvantage of all.
Likewise, the dilemma may be the result of strategy. A party or
their counsel may perceive that it could obtain a strategic advantage
over the opposing party by "employing obstructionist, overreaching or
combative tactics," potentially limiting the opponent's ability to obtain
needed and discoverable information, while itself "reaping the benefits
of receiving full discovery from its more cooperative opponent."6
Aware of this perception, both sides end up adopting a noncooperative approach as a defensive strategy, so that neither side
benefits from a "unilateral advantage" over the other.61 Unfortunately,
when these "hardball discovery"62 tactics are used, both parties end up
worse off, with the failure to cooperate prolonging discovery and
generating unnecessary expense, and with neither party gaining the
strategic high ground.
57

Bone, supra note 26, at 1355.

The Sedona Conference, The Casefor Cooperation,10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 361
(2009) (hereinafter Casefor Cooperation].
59 Grimm, supra note 53, at 27.
60 Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 361.
58

61

See generally CooperationProclamation,supra note 27.

62 Network

2004).

Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C.
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In a recent case, the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina encountered a common example of the cooperative
discovery dilemma when calculating the lodestar amount for purposes
of awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.63 The court
characterized the underlying merits of the case as straightforward.
The Plaintiff, a company in the business of designing and creating
newsletters for multi-unit apartment and residential complexes and
franchise businesses, brought suit against an employee for
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information.64 At
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff company and, shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff moved for, and was awarded, attorney's fees.65
Despite the straightforward nature of the claim, the court noted that
the parties, from the initiation of the lawsuit, set about making the
litigation "as complicated, onerous and time-consuming as possible."66
In reviewing the plaintiffs time records, submitted in support of its
requested fee award, the court found that the company "spent an
inordinate amount of time on unnecessary and/or duplicative
motions," including discovery motions, and noted that "the docket
reveals that the parties often initiated or opposed motions on matters
which most litigants resolve by consent, including motions for
extensions of time."67 Likewise, the parties refused to participate in
cooperative discovery, "resorting to filing competing motions to
compel and/or motions for protective orders."68 A significant amount
of time was devoted to a dispute among the parties regarding the
The court
breadth and scope of e-discovery in the case.69
acknowledged that discovery of ESI may interject "an element of
complexity into an otherwise routine matter."7 However, rather than
resolving their e-discovery issues by collaborating and cooperating
with their respective experts, "each party held steadfast in their
positions concerning the scope of electronic discovery without
compromise which needlessly increased" litigation costs.71 The court
made clear that the disputes related to e-discovery, and the parties'
63

Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, No. 6:08-cv-01208-JMC, 2012 WL 4478365, at *1, *5

(D.S.C.
64

Sept. 25, 2012).

Id. at *1, *4.
1Id. at *2-3.
66 Id. at *4.
65

67ld. at *5.
68

id.
69 See Uhlig, LLC, 2012 WL 4478365, at
70 id.
71

1d.

*5.
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motions requesting broader discovery, in the end, "did not materially
impact the case" in any way."
If we were to evaluate this case in terms of the prisoner's dilemma,
the case might be summarized in the following figure. (Recall that in
the traditional prisoner's dilemma, the payoff values represented years
in jail. Here, the payoff values represent some strategic benefit that
would be obtained by each party, so that the goal is to obtain the
highest payoff value possible.)
Plaintiff Company:

Defendant
Employee:
Cooperate and
collaborate
with opposing
experts to
develop ESI
plan
Refuse to
cooperate and
collaborate

Cooperate and
collaborate
with opposing
experts to
develop ESI
plan

cooperate and
coperate

3, 3

0, 5

5, 0

1, 1

Thus, were both parties to cooperate and coordinate with opposing
counsel and their experts to develop an ESI plan, both would obtain
necessary and discoverable information at less expense, resulting in an
equally good payoff of 3 for both parties. However, apparently stuck
on the notion that discovery is a game involving obfuscating, stalling,
and contesting wherever possible, neither party cooperates, refusing to
offer their ESI experts for collaboration and refusing to coordinate
with the opposing party's experts. This notion is grounded, at least in
part, on fear that one-sided cooperation, unreciprocated by the
opposing side, leaves a party vulnerable, having provided too much
information, and not obtaining equally candid responses or
information in return, as represented by the 5-0 and 0-5 values. The
72 id.
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result of mutual non-cooperation is a smaller payoff of 1 for both
parties, where that lower value represents the additional costs incurred
in requesting, obtaining, sorting, and processing voluminous ESI.
The figure could be modified to show payoff values that represent
costs incurred by each party in pursuing discovery. In that instance,
the figure would appear as follows, and each party's aim would be to
obtain necessary and discoverable information through the discovery
process while incurring the smallest cost possible. Thus, were both
parties to cooperate to limit the scope of ESI and to develop the best
search terms, the costs of requesting, producing, obtaining, reviewing,
sorting, and processing ESI for each party might be approximately
$3,000. However, out of fear of providing opposing counsel with
access to their experts and/or search terminology without obtaining the
same in return (as represented by the $5,000-$1,000 value and the
$1,000-$5,000 value, where the party that does cooperate ends up
giving opposing counsel cheaper and easier access to its material,
while not obtaining the same benefit), both parties end up not
cooperating and, consequently, spending more on e-discovery.
Plaintiff Company:

Defendant
Employee:
Cooperate and
collaborate
with opposing
experts to
develop ESI
plan
Refuse to
cooperate and
collaborate

Cooperate and
collaborate with
opposing experts
to develop ESI
plan

Refuse to
cooperate and
collaborate

$3,000; $3,000

$1,000; $5,000

$5,000; $1,000

$7,000; $7,000

In the case described above, the court reduced the plaintiffs
requested fee award by sixty percent, based in part on the excessive

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 43.2

amount of time devoted to discovery.7 3 In doing so, it noted that much
of the information obtained through e-discovery "did not materially
impact the case."74 Cooperation by counsel could have ensured that
discovery was more narrowly tailored and limited to the matters at
issue in the case, thereby significantly decreasing the costs and burden
of production.75 Instead, the parties' inability to coordinate with their
respective experts with regard to ESI resulted in both parties spending
more money to request and produce discovery, the results of which
were largely immaterial to the final disposition of the case.
The problem of non-responsive, evasive answers to discovery
requests likewise present a classic prisoner's dilemma. Experience
shows that non-specific, boilerplate objections to discovery requests,
and non-responsive, evasive answers, are all too commonplace and
pose a serious barrier to conducting discovery in a timely and costefficient manner, as they tend to generate motions to compel.76 Take
the following scenario: A Scheduling Order is issued in a federal case,
and discovery requests are promptly served by both parties. Were
both parties to provide responsive, non-evasive answers to the
discovery requests and/or specific, non-boilerplate objections-as the
Federal Rules plainly require 77-- both parties would obtain an equally
good payoff of 3. Even if motions to compel are necessary, the cost of
litigating such motions will be substantially decreased, as the parties
already will have outlined their objections in detail, allowing the
opposing party to promptly raise their counterpoints and enabling the
court to make a prompt decision. 8 However, because experience in
practice has led many lawyers to believe that the opposing side will
present only evasive, incomplete, and non-responsive answers and/or
boilerplate objections to their discovery requests, and because strategic
or attitudinal considerations may enforce that belief, both sides are
likely to defect, resulting in a lower payoff for both parties (as
"
Id.at *7, *10.
74

1d. at *5.
75Paul W. Grimm, The State of Discovery Practicein Civil Cases: Must the Rules

Be Changedto Reduce Costs andBurden, or Can Significant Improvements Be

Achieved Within Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF.J. 47, 60 (2011).
76 See generally Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362.
77 FED. R.Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (document
requests); D. Md. Loc. R. 104.6; Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468,470 (D. Md.
2005); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D.
Md. 2001); Marens v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 38-39 (D. Md.
2000).
78 Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 343.
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represented by the 1-1 payoff).79 The motivation to defect is enhanced
by the fear (represented by the 5-0 and 0-5 payoffs) that the provision
of responsive, non-evasive answers and non-boilerplate objections by
one party will provide the opposing party a strategic advantage,
assuming the same kinds of responses are not provided in return.8"
Indeed, where one party provides responsive, non-evasive answers and
non-boilerplate objections, the cost of the opposing party litigating any
motions to compel arising from the discovery responses is likely to be
smaller than if the first party had provided evasive answers and
boilerplate objections. 8
Party 1:

Party 2:
Provide
responsive, nonevasive answers
and nonboilerplate
objections to
discovery
requests
Provide nonresponsive,
evasive answers
and boilerplate
objections to
discovery
requests

Provide
responsive,
non-evasive
answers and
non-boilerplate
objections to
discovery
requests.

Provide nonresponsive,
evasive
answers and
boilerplate
objections to
discovery
requests

3,3

0,5

5, 0

1, 1

See Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 361.
80 Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 361.
81 Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 343.
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Thus, a number of possible factors may dissuade cooperation.
Another example of an instance in which cooperative discovery often
breaks down is where one party is proceeding in an action without
legal representation." Given the complexity of the rules governing
discovery, and the likelihood that a pro se party has no legal training,
frustrations commonly arise on both sides, with the pro se litigant
often feeling abused or overburdened by the opposing side's discovery
requests, and opposing counsel experiencing frustrations related to the
insufficiency, or lack entirely, of discovery responses.83 It is not
uncommon, additionally, for pro se litigants to become frustrated by
objections raised to their discovery requests, even legitimate, nonboilerplate objections, due to a lack of familiarity with legal jargon or
rules.8" As a result, the pro se party may be predisposed against
cooperation, while the party proceeding with counsel may have its
own apprehensions regarding cooperation with a pro se litigant,
leading both parties to choose defection and antagonism over
cooperation and courtesy, to the detriment of all.
It may be that the notion that discovery, and particularly ediscovery, is a prisoner's dilemma is, as Maura Grossman noted in a
recent article, a self-fulfilling prophesy, "with the effect of
incentivizing counsel for either party to engage in bad behavior, in the
belief that it is the rational choice under the circumstances."85
Regardless of the precision with which each unique discovery dispute
will fit into the squares of the prisoner's dilemma, the perception that
opposing counsel is likely to engage in bad discovery behavior, and
Calhoun v. Robinson, No. C08-5744 RJB/KLS, 2009 WL 3326760, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 13, 2009) ("Contention may defeat cooperation and effective discovery
and this process may be exacerbated when one party is pro se."). See generally, e.g.,
Adams v. Sharfstein, No. CCB- 11-3755, 2012 WL 2992172 (D. Md. July 19, 2012).
83See, e.g., Adams, 2012 WL 2992172, at *6 (noting apro se Plaintiff's request
that
the Court oversee all discovery in the case based on her perception that defense
counsel was using discovery against her in an abusive fashion); Dancy v. Univ. of
N.C. at Charlotte, No. 3:08-CV-166-RJC-DCK, 2009 WL 2424039, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 3, 2009) (noting the defendant's frustration with the pro se plaintiff s failure to
respond to various discovery requests).
84 See Adams, 2012 WL 2992172, at *6.
85 Maura R. Grossman, Some Thoughts on Incentives, Rules, and Ethics Concerning
the Use of Search Technology in E-Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 89, 97 (2011)
(explaining that, in e-discovery, several elements of the basic prisoner's dilemma are
missing: (1) the requirement that each party make an "irrevocable choice of strategy"
without knowledge of the other party's choice; (2) the requirement that bad behavior
on the part of one party reduces the impact of another party's bad behavior; and (3)
the requirement that the game be played only once).
82
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the counterbalancing incentive to do the same, poses a real problem
toward achieving cooperative discovery.
III.

STEPPING OUTSIDE THE BOXES

In 2008, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland opined that while "judges, scholars, commentators and
lawyers themselves long have recognized the problems associated with
abusive discovery, what has been missing is a thoughtful means to
engage all the stakeholders in the litigation process-lawyers, judge
and the public at large-and provide them with the encouragement,
86
means and incentive to approach discovery in a different way."
While strides have been made in recent years to provide such
encouragement and incentives, continued engagement with the topic
of facilitating cooperative discovery remains necessary.
The discovery "game" can be ended, and the prisoner's dilemma
solved, in a number of possible ways, all geared toward encouraging
and facilitating cooperation among the parties and their counsel. First,
unlike in the classic prisoner's dilemma, where the actors' choices are
made alone, and without supervision and guidance, discovery occurs
in a context where an "intervening enforcement authority" may
promote cooperation over defection. 7 Of course, trial judges cannot
possibly hear and decide every possible discovery dispute that arises
among parties and counsel, given high caseloads and other limitations
on their time."8 Instead, early and proactive judicial management of
discovery may provide a solution. 9 A number of studies conducted
and commentaries made in recent years, including those undertaken by
the American Bar Association90 and the Institute for the Advancement
of the American Legal System,9' have concluded that "the most
Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363.
See Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 362.
88 Gensler, supra note 4, at 535-36; The Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 343.
89 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference CooperationProclamation:
86

87

Resourcesfor the Judiciary,9 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Resourcesfor the Judiciary].
90 See generally ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
DETAILED REPORT (2009), availableat
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigatin/survey/docs/report
aba report.authcheckdam.pdf.
91 See generally IAALS, 21 ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR
REFORM: PILOT PROJECT RULES (2009), available at
http://www.actl.com/am/template.cfm?section=home&template=/cm/contentdisplay.
cfm&contentid=4509; IAALS, 21 ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP
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effective way to control litigation costs is for a judge to take charge of
the case from its inception and to manage it aggressively through the
pretrial process by helping shape, limit, and enforce a reasonable
discovery plan," and by keeping the case on a strict schedule to ensure
that disposition of the matter is as expeditious as possible.92
Thus, judges could control discovery, and preemptively limit
discovery disputes and foster cooperative discovery, by issuing, along
with their standard Scheduling Order, a Discovery Order that will
guide discovery in each case. The purpose of such a Discovery Order
is not to change the party-driven nature of discovery.93 Rather, as the
Sedona Conference has explained, active case management "provides
a strong framework in which the parties should develop and execute
their own cooperative discovery plans."94 Discovery Orders would
operate to provide "a clear set of expectations" that push "the
evidence-gathering phase of the litigation forward in a speedy and
inexpensive way, without the cost, delay, and gamesmanship
associated with unmanaged discovery."95 The following types of
guidelines could be put into place by such an Order, all of which
together should have the impact of eliminating needless discovery
disputes and encouraging the parties to confer and cooperate
throughout discovery:
Early Disclosure of Damages Claims and Relief Sought.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), judges
may direct any party asserting a claim against another party to
serve on that party and provide to the Court information
relating to the calculation of damages and a particularized
statement regarding any non-monetary relief sought. In
requiring that such disclosures be made early in the litigation, a
judge encourages the parties to focus on what is directly at
issue in the case and to consider the proportionality of their
discovery requests vis A vis the ultimate relief sought. With
such information identified early, the parties are more likely to
FOR REFORM: CASE FLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES (2009), availableat

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Librar
y/IAALS,% 2ORoadmap%20for%20Reform,%20Civil%2OCaseflow%20Managemen
t%20Guidelines.pdf.
92 Grimm, supra note 86, at
49.
93 Resourcesfor the Judiciary,supra
note 101, at 4.
94 Resourcesfor the Judiciary,supra note

95 Resourcesfor the Judiciary,supra note

101, at 4.
101, at 4.
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cooperate, particularly because any later requests for attorney's
fees relating to time spent conducting discovery or engaging in
discovery disputes will be measured against what is at stake in
the case.96

Phased Discovery. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii), a judge may
direct the parties to conduct discovery in phases, thereby
eliminating many preliminary disputes regarding the scope of
discovery, allowing the parties to obtain essential information
early in the case so that later requests may be more narrowly
tailored and less likely the subject of objection and dispute, and
saving time and cost. A phased approach to discovery might
proceed as follows: In the first phase, the parties are directed to
focus on those facts that are most essential to resolving the
case-whether by trial, settlement, or dispositive motion.
Thus, the parties may seek any non-privileged, non-work
product information that is likely to be admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and that is material to proof of
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. By narrowing the
scope of information that is discoverable in Phase 1 to exclude
information that might otherwise be discoverable under the
broad scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), a
judge encourages the parties to focus on what is most essential
to their claims and defenses.
In the second phase, upon a showing of good cause, the parties
may be permitted to seek the information contemplated by
Rule 26(b)(l)-any non-privileged, non-work product
information that is relevant to the claims and defenses pleaded
or more generally to the subject matter of the litigation. The
necessary showing of good cause must demonstrate that any
additional discovery undertaken in Phase 2 will be proportional
to the issues at stake in the litigation, taking into consideration
96

See, e.g., Oracle,264 F.R.D. at 543 (stating that "the Court has repeatedly

emphasized that the scope of this case required cooperation in prioritizing discovery

and in being mindful of the proportionality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26," and noting that counsel's failure to provide prompt disclosure of their
damages claims and "failure to cooperate on defining the contours of appropriate
discovery .... threaten[ed] the fair and cost-effective exchange of relevant
discovery" in the case).
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the costs already incurred in Phase 1 and the factors stated in
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii). If additional discovery is permitted
in Phase 2, the party seeking such discovery may be required to
show cause as to why it should not be ordered to pay all or a
part of the cost of the additional discovery sought.
Phased discovery facilitates cooperation by eliminating
variables that tend to dissuade cooperation. Where the scope
of discoverable information is phased and limited, parties must
be reflective, and will be discouraged from issuing the kind of
overbroad, unlimited discovery requests that tend to lead to
disputes and generate additional costs. Further, where the cost
of additional discovery in Phase 2 is presumed to be imposed
on the party seeking such additional discovery, that party is
less likely to engage in any game play. Indeed, judges who
have ordered phased discovery have found that the parties
rarely return for Phase 2." Instead, the parties cooperate to
identify what questions should be asked, what information
must be gathered, and the most efficient means of obtaining it.
Impact of Failing to Cooperate. A Discovery Order may
provide that the failure of a party or counsel to cooperate
throughout discovery will be relevant to resolving any
discovery disputes, including whether the Court will permit
discovery beyond Phase 1, and if so, who will bear the cost of
that additional discovery. Likewise, an Order may provide that
whether a party or counsel has cooperated during discovery
will be relevant in determining whether sanctions should be
imposed when ruling on discovery motions.
* Limitations on Filing Discovery Motions. Despite the good
faith certificate requirement stated throughout the federal
discovery rules, experience has shown that parties nonetheless
fail to confer and cooperate prior to filing discovery motions,
or at least fail to do so in any meaningful fashion. Thus, a
Discovery Order might require the parties to request a
telephone conference with the Court prior to filing a discovery
motion, with an aim toward resolving the dispute informally
and fostering a cooperative spirit among counsel. Only where
97

Grimm, supranote 86, at 60.
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the request for a conference is denied, or where the conference
fails to resolve the dispute, will a motion be permitted.
Effect of Boilerplate Objections and Evasive, NonResponsive Answers to Discovery Requests. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), the judge may
remind counsel and the parties in a Discovery Order that any
boilerplate objections to discovery requests and/or any evasive,
non-responsive answers to discovery requests will be treated as
a failure to answer and/or will result in waiver of the
objections. A significant amount of time, energy, and expense
is spent in motions practice related to a party providing
responses to discovery requests that are evasive and non98
responsive, or that contain boilerplate, nonspecific objections.
A reminder about the impact of boilerplate objections and
evasive answers is likely to facilitate cooperation, particularly
as sanctions may be. awarded for the failure to answer, and
cooperation in discovery is a factor to be considered in
determining the nature and amount of such sanctions.
*

Production of ESI. A Discovery Order may dictate that the
parties are to cooperate to develop search methodology and
criteria that will achieve proportionality in ESI discovery,
including the appropriate use of computer-assisted search
This may require coordination with the
methodology.
opposing party's ESI experts. Where such cooperation is
dictated, the parties may be less likely to attempt to hide the
ball with regard to search methodology development.
Additionally, a Discovery Order may limit the scope of ESI
discovery, eliminating the possibility of the kind of cooperative
breakdown discussed above. For example, a judge may order
that, absent a showing of good cause or stipulation by the
parties, a party from whom ESI is requested will not be
required to search for responsive ESI: (1) from more than ten
key custodians; (2) that was created more than five years
before the lawsuit was filed; (3) from sources not reasonably
accessible without undue burden or cost; or (4) for more than a

See, e.g., Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 350 (D. Md. 2012);
Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565 (D. Md. 2010); Corsair Special
Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Sys., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D. Md.
2010); Sabol v. Brooks, 469 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Md. 2006).
98
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set number of hours, exclusive of time spent reviewing the ESI
determined to be responsive for privilege or work-product
protection, provided that the producing party can demonstrate
to the court and its adversary that the search was effectively
designed and efficiently conducted.99
Agreements Regarding Non-Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege or Work Product Protection. A Discovery Order
may further encourage cooperation during discovery by
requiring that the parties consider whether the costs and
burdens of discovery, especially discovery of ESI, may be
reduced by entering into a non-waiver agreement pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(e). To the extent that the Court
adopts the parties' agreement as a Court Order, it will limit
waiver in any other state or federal proceeding, 0 which
should have the effect of calming counsel's nerves regarding
inadvertent disclosure and thereby facilitating cooperation. In
addition, the Order may encourage the parties to discuss
whether to use computer-assisted search methodology to
facilitate pre-production review of ESI to identify information
that is beyond the scope of discovery because it is attorneyclient privileged or work product protected material.
A number of courts have adopted local rules that address
cooperative discovery, acknowledging that "[w]hen the parties and
lawyers know at the outset what the court expects, and that if they fail
to behave accordingly, they will suffer meaningful adverse
consequences, they are far more likely to fall into line."'' 1 While
99 See Ronald J. Hedges, The Sedona Conference Points the Way Toward Control of

the Costs and Burden of E-Discovery, 59 FED. LAW. 46, 47 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (stating
that cooperation in e-discovery may be achieved by: "using internal ESI discovery
'point persons' to assist counsel in preparing requests and responses; exchanging
information on relevant data sources, including those not being searched, or
scheduling early disclosures on the topic of ESI; jointly developing automated
search and retrieval methodologies to cull relevant information; promoting early
identification of form or forms of production; developing case-long discovery
budgets based on proportionality principles; and considering the use of courtappointed experts ....to resolve discovery disputes.").
00Fed. R. Evid. 502(d). For more on rule 502, see generally Paul W. Grimm, Lisa
Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, FederalRule of Evidence 502: Has It
Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 8 (2011).
10 Grimm, supra note 86, at 61.
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individual judges may issue Discovery Orders, or may make judicial
rulings regarding cooperative discovery, formalizing the requirement
that discovery be cooperative in a local rule reinforces the uniformity
of the requirement among the judges of a given court and establishes a
court-wide expectation for litigants and their attorneys that is not
likely to be ignored. 1°2 These local rules may take a number of forms,
as illustrated above. As Professor Steven Gensler has noted, local
rules that elaborate on duties established by the Federal Rules tend to
be particularly helpful." 3 For example, where local rules elaborate on
what is required in the Rule 26(f) conference, lawyers who read the
local rules "will be hard pressed to argue that they did not fully
appreciate the scope of issues they are required to discuss and about
which they are required to pursue agreement in good faith."1 4 And for
' 5
some lawyers, the "extra guidance might be genuinely educational."'
Likewise, rules that encourage cooperation more broadly may "help
to
lawyers better appreciate their cooperation duties or lead lawyers
10 6
1
cooperation.'
voluntary
of
benefits
the
to
give increased thought
As the foregoing reveals, a variety of options are available to
judges and courts in their quest to encourage and facilitate
cooperation. It seems, however, that no matter the amount of judicial
encouragement, in the form of judicial rulings, local rules, or
discovery orders, or even in the form of allegedly deterrent sanctions
orders, real change must begin with the parties themselves, and with
their counsel. How can parties and their counsel be encouraged to
stop playing the "discovery game" and move toward cooperative
discovery?
Game theory teaches us that iterative games-those played
repeatedly over time-tend to generate cooperation, rather than
defection, as the players are forced to consider how cooperation or
defection in one instance will impact their payoffs in the future. °7
Thus, when the discovery game is iterative, the conduct of parties and
their counsel may shift, becoming more or less cooperative, depending
on how cooperative the opposing side was in the past." 8 Where a
See Grimm, supra note 86, at 61.
103 Gensler, supra note 4, at 374.
104 Gensler, supra note 4, at 373.
105 Gensler, supra note 4, at 373.
106 Gensler, supra note 4, at 374.
107 See, e.g., Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 361; Grossman, supra note 96,
at 97.
108 David Hyman, When Rules Collide: ProceduralIntersection & Rule of Law, 71
102

TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1426 (1997) ("Discovery ....

is a two-way street, and at least
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party has been burned in the past, they are less likely to choose
cooperation with the offending party or person. °9 Where, however,
experience with an opposing party or an opposing counsel has, in the
past, been cooperative, facilitating discovery at a lower cost, everyone
involved is likely to choose cooperation."' Of course, some games
may never be iterative: A party may encounter an opposing party or an
opposing counsel only once (particularly where the opposing party is
pro se), and so that discovery game will never benefit from the
cooperation engendered by multiple interactions, unless a party or
attorney's capacity for cooperation becomes a part of the reputation
that proceeds them, and the party or attorney is committed to
maintaining that reputation."' However, where a party appears or an
attorney practices regularly in a particular court, the same kind of
iteration-created cooperation may occur, as parties or attorneys would
benefit, over time, from being favorably viewed by the court as
cooperative. "2
Both attorneys and their clients may need to make an attitude
adjustment when it comes to cooperating in discovery. For some
clients, who approach litigation with a "kill or be killed" strategy,
cooperation may be a tough sell." 3 Attorneys should be prepared to
explain the value of cooperation to their clients: The failure of a party
to cooperate in discovery "may trigger non-cooperative conduct" from
the opposing party, thus prolonging discovery and generating
unnecessary expense." 4 Uncooperative conduct could "lead to an
adverse decision or sanctions" in any future discovery disputes."5
Cooperative discovery therefore is in the client's best interests as it is
"likely [to] result in less production, fewer court filings," lower costs,
has the potential to proceed as a classic iterative prisoner's dilemma, with the parties
tailoring their requests and responses based on their perception of how the other side
is behaving.").
109See Cat Casey, A Game Theorist Perspective on E-Discovery, HUDSON LEGAL

BLOG: DISCOVERY INPRACTICE (Feb. 21, 2012), http://hudsonlegalblog.com/ediscovery/game-theorist-perspective-e-discovery.html.
110 See Seatear, supra note 4, at 616, 619.
111See Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 361.
112 See Casefor Cooperation,supra note 66, at 362 ("Indeed,
that attorneys will

again appear before the courts, and their clients may as well, creates a dynamic in
which the threat of future obstructionist conduct by opponents, or risk of gaining a
reputation among the judiciary as unduly combative during discovery, encourages
[cooperation].").
113Grimm, supra note 53, at 31.
114 Grimm, supra note 53, at 31.
115 See Grimm, supra note 53, at 31.
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and a more favorable position in any future disputes. 16 For attorneys
needing an attitude adjustment, a number of helpful materials have
been provided and are being developed by The Sedona Conference
and other institutions, which are designed to educate attorneys about
the value of cooperation and to develop tools and suggest techniques
for facilitating cooperative discovery.' 7 With regard to attorneys, it
makes sense that a change in attitudes toward cooperative discovery
should begin in law schools. 1 8 While law schools generally have not
focused on discovery practice outside of 1L Civil Procedure courses," 9
a shift in attitudes within legal education is beginning to surface, as
more law schools offer courses in practical litigation skills. 2 ' These
courses should lay the groundwork for future cooperative discovery by
training the next generation of lawyers in the skills necessary to
facilitate and achieve such discovery.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cooperative discovery has been stressed by judges, courts, legal
institutions, and legal commentators through judicial rulings, sanction
awards, local rules and discovery guidelines, and aspirational
documents, praising the value of such cooperation for years.
Nonetheless, cooperation in discovery remains lacking in many
instances. One explanation for this phenomenon is that cooperative
116

See Grimm, supra note 53, at 31.

117

See, e.g., Sedona Conference Webinar, Cooperation Guidancefor Litigators &

In-House Counsel (June 7, 2011), available at
https://thesedonaconference.org/conference/20 11/cooperation-guidance-litigatorshouse-counsel. See generally Cooperation Proclamation,supra note 27, at 332-33
(noting intent to develop and distribute "toolkits to train and support lawyers, judges,
other professionals, and students in techniques of discovery cooperation,
collaboration, and transparency," components of which will include "training
programs tailored to each stakeholder; a clearinghouse of practical resources,
including form agreements, case management orders, discovery protocols, etc.;
court-annexed e-discovery ADR with qualified counselors and mediators, available
to assist parties of limited means; .... [and] law school programs to train students in
the technical, legal, and cooperative aspects of e-discovery").
118 Grimm, supra note 86, at 58.
119 See Grimm, supra note 86, at 58.
120 For example, at the University of Baltimore School of Law, a course is offered in
Discovery Practice & Procedure, which focuses on best practices and proposals for
reform of discovery under the state and federal rules of civil procedure. The law
school also offers an Electronic Evidence and Discovery Workshop. See Univ. of
Balt. School of Law, Elective Courses, http://law.ubalt.edu/academics/jdprogram/courseofferings/electivecourses.cfm (last published Jan. 4, 2013).
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discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma for attorneys and litigants. In
this Article, we have presented a number of suggestions for stepping
outside of the prisoner's dilemma's boxes. These suggestions include
proactive judicial case management in the form of Discovery Orders
designed to provide a clear set of expectations for cooperation and to
create deadlines and obligations that facilitate cooperative behavior,
the institution of local rules and discovery guidelines by courts, and
attitudinal adjustments for attorneys and their clients. Where the rules
that govern the prisoner's dilemma game are taken away, by adding an
intervening enforcement authority that encourages and facilities
cooperation among the players, encouraging players to consider the
iterative nature of the litigation game, and encouraging attitudinal
shifts from the ground up, we may achieve cooperative discovery after
all.

